characterize his thinking and writing. At one time (p. 82) the state seems to mean to him the whole body of the nation as a personified unit greatly desiring that each member should wash himself daily, but regretfully refraining from such a requirement because it would be too much trouble to compel such ablutions. Again (pp. 69, 70) it appears a figment of the imagination for which heroes may find it sweet to die, while at another place (p. 69) he regards it as a sort of mask behind which the "real rulers" of society may hide while they subject the unconscious citizenry to their will. So far as one can determine from the text, these "real rulers" are not kings, presidents, governors, or even senators, but the political bosses, sometimes in petticoats. Sovereignty, if there is any such thing, appears to reside in these same shadowy rulers, who not only create the state, but create and control the courts as well (pp. 70, 122, 123).

But it is in the initial chapter on legal rights and duties that Professor Gray shows most clearly that jurisprudence was but an incidental diversion to America's greatest authority on the law of real estate. The distinction between the several legal relations which the late Professor Hohfeld so convincingly defined under the terms *rights, powers, privileges,* and *immunities* with their respective correlatives, the author never clearly perceived. Following the continental jurists he recognizes that legal rights and duties are mutually correlatives. He then declares it is impossible for a right to exist without its correlative duty, yet curiously enough, he states that there are many duties that get along very well without any correlative rights to support them. These are the fabled "self-regardant" duties of the jurists—a sort of solo duties which do not involve any relation whatever to other persons. The distinguished author's confusion of thought is shown amusingly in the following passage, in which he is discussing these strange duties so sadly divorced from their correlative rights: "There may be a duty to do an act to a person where we cannot say that he has a right to have the act done. Thus, it may be the duty of Jack Ketch to hang Jonathan Wild, but we do not say that Wild has a right to be hanged." Hohfeld would say that Jack Ketch owed a duty to the High Sheriff of London to execute the death warrant, and that the High Sheriff had a correlative right that Jack should execute it; and that what the unfortunate Jonathan Wild has is a painful liability, correlative to Jack's legal power to hang him. So the author often uses the term *right* when he means *privilege* (for example, to eat shrimp salad, or to set up the statute of limitations in an action) or immunity (for example, under exemption laws) and naturally finds difficulty in discovering the correlative duties.

But however philosophers may quarrel over concepts and their names, there is no gainsaying that this is a delightful book, both entertaining and stimulating.

WILLIAM R. VANCE.

Yale University School of Law.

Conflict of Laws. By John P. Tiernan. Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1921. pp. vii. 122.

This work purports to deal with the following subjects in the Conflict of Laws: Comity, Torts, Death Action, Contracts, Remedies, Interest and Usury, Sales and Chattel Mortgages, Marriage, Legitimation and Adoption, Wills, Crimes, and Penal Actions, but contains only the fundamental rule and exception governing each topic, and one or two cases by way of illustration. The book is too elementary to be of real use.

E. G. LORENZEN.

Yale University School of Law.